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Earthquake Risk, Earthquake Rapid
Response System, and Early Warning
System in Istanbul
Mustafa Erdik

I. Background

T

urkey ranks high among countries suffering loss of life and property due to earthquakes over many centuries. So far in this century
there have been earthquakes in Turkey that caused over 110,000 deaths,
about 250,000 hospitalizations, and close to 600,000 destroyed housing
units.
As indicated in Table 1, the series of devastating earthquakes during
the last decade has caused housing losses in the hundreds of thousands, loss of lives in the tens of thousands, and a financial loss in
excess of US $22 billion (about 10% of the average GDP or about 1%
annual GDP loss).
Following the losses suffered during the two major earthquakes
that struck Turkey in 1999, there has been a broad recognition among
Turkey’s governmental, non-governmental, and academic organizations of the need for extensive response planning based on detailed
risk analyses of likely seismic hazards in Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular.
In recent decades, earthquake disaster risks in the urban centers of
Turkey have increased, mainly due to very high rates of urbanization,
faulty land-use planning and construction, inadequate infrastructure
and services, and environmental degradation. Several studies have
shown that the vulnerabilities of Turkish building stock are at least an
order of magnitude higher than their counterparts in California, which
shares a comparable level of earthquake hazard.1 This greater
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Table 1. Recent Earthquake Losses in Turkey

Earthquake

Lives
Lost

Housing Units
Damaged/Collapsed

Number of
Homeless

Approximate
Total Damage
(USD Billions)

1992 Erzincan
1995 Dinar
1998 Adana-Ceyhan
1999 Kocaeli
1999 Düzce

0,0
0,0645
0,0100
0,0
0,0150
0,0
18,000
0,0812
0,0

8,000/1,500
6,500/2,000
21,000/2,000
320,000/40,000
10,100/800

010,000
008,000
00
024,000
600,000
—

01.0
00.4
00.5
20.0
01.0

vulnerability can be traced to several reasons. Essentially, the building development system was conducive to poor construction due to
chronically high rates of inflation (consequently, very limited mortgage and insurance, impediments to large-scale development, and
industrialization of the construction sector); high rates of urbanization
that created a demand for inexpensive housing; ineffective control and
supervision of design and construction; limited enforcement of regulations; no accountability; and the government acting as a free insurer
of earthquake risk. The other important source of the increased risk in
Istanbul is the unprecedented probability of the occurrence of a large
earthquake, which stands at about 65% during the coming year.
The inevitability of such a large earthquake in Istanbul makes it
imperative that certain preparedness and emergency procedures be
contrived in the event of and prior to an earthquake disaster. This
requires the quantification of earthquake effects on the physical and
social environments and, subsequently, the development of urban
earthquake risk mitigation master plans that develop and elaborate
upon short- and long-term strategies. The basic tenets of earthquake
risk mitigation are: do not increase the existing risk (build properly);
decrease the existing risk (retrofit); and transfer the risk (insurance).
Reduction of the structural vulnerability, siting and land-use regulations, design and construction regulations, relocation of communities, and public education/awareness programs are viable measures for
the mitigation of earthquake risk. Urban settlements can be improved
by changing the functional characteristics of the settlements through
land-use planning as well as increasing the redundancy of the infrastructure, such as building an additional bridge at a strategic crossing,
for example.
New buildings in Istanbul are generally being built much better than
the existing building stock. The reasons for this improvement are the
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application of a new (1998) earthquake resistant design code; increased
public awareness and demand for earthquake safety; various training and education programs for engineers; better zoning regulations
and enforcement by municipalities; and control by private construction supervision firms. New legislation (Revision of Law on Engineering and Architecture, Building Design and Construction Control, and
Standard Development Regulations for Municipalities) enacted after
the 1999 earthquakes provided help in this regard. For Istanbul the
most important and complex issue in mitigating earthquake casualties
is the retrofit of existing buildings.
The 1999 Kocaeli earthquake clearly demonstrates that Turkey needs
a new emergency management plan that is effective from top down
and bottom up. The plan and its provisions need to be created from
scratch and practiced frequently. The highly centralized, hierarchical,
top-down characteristic of disaster management in Turkey discourages
local initiatives and limits community participation. Despite the rigid
structure of the system, ad hoc management and a lack of coordination
were substantial problems, as witnessed in the first days of the 1999
Kocaeli earthquake. Communication, coordination, and cooperation
problems between appointed and elected administrators have, in certain cases, hindered effective Search-and-Rescue and relief operations.
Lack of a rapid loss estimation system, lack of disaster scenarios and
disaster operation plans, shortage of equipment and materials, and an
absence of disaster response training all hindered organized and effective search, rescue, and relief efforts.
Although worldwide it is well known that the potential impact of
large earthquakes on urban societies can be reduced by timely and
correct action immediately before (Early Warning) and after (Rapid
Response) a disastrous earthquake, these concepts and technologies
were brought onto the Turkish scene only after the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake. Earthquake Early Warning in urban and industrial areas allows
for clean emergency shutdown of systems susceptible to damage, such
as power stations, transportation, computer centers, and telephone
systems. The Rapid Response systems, on the other hand, provide
reliable information for accurate, effective characterization of the shaking and damage for rapid emergency assistance, search, and rescue
responses. After a brief quantification of the earthquake risk in Istanbul, this article will provide a description of the Istanbul Earthquake
Rapid Response and Early Warning System.
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II. Estimated Residential Building Losses and
Casualties in Istanbul due to Earthquake
Istanbul faces a significant earthquake hazard and risk as illustrated by
the earthquake risk scenario.2
A. Earthquake Hazard
Earthquake hazard in the Istanbul region is essentially controlled by
the Main Marmara Fault (part of the North Anatolian Fault) passing
about 20 km south of the city in the Marmara Sea. Based on low-resolution bathymetric data and earthquake occurrences, several researchers have developed different tectonic models for the Marmara Sea.
Data obtained during the recent high-resolution bathymetric survey by
the Ifremer RV Le Suroit vessel indicates that a single, thoroughgoing
strike-slip fault system (Main Marmara Fault) cuts the Marmara Sea
from east to west, joining the August 17, 1999 Kocaeli earthquake fault
with the August 9, 1912 Sarkoy-Murefte earthquake fault. The Main
Marmara Fault is argued to be a very young structure (about 200,000
years old), cutting across the older structures that formed the present
NNE-SSW extensional pull-apart morphology of the Marmara Sea. It
exhibits the typical characteristics of a major strike-slip fault. The fault
follows the northern boundary of the Çınarcık Basin between Yesilköy
and the entrance of the Gulf of Izmit (Figure 1). For the Main Marmara
Fault, the slip rate is in the range of 2–3 cm/year.3
In Istanbul, earthquake records spanning two millennia indicate
that, on average, at least one medium intensity (epicentral intensity,
Io=VII–VIII) earthquake has affected the city every fifty years.4 The
average return period for high intensity (epicentral intensity, Io=VIII–
IX) events has been 300 years. The earthquake damage experienced by
the historical structures in Istanbul has been well documented. It has
been determined that the Hagia Sophia museum was affected by intensities reaching to IX during earthquakes in 1509 and 1754.5 The 1999
Kocaeli earthquake (Mw=7.4) occurred on the North Anatolian Fault
Zone with a macroseismic epicenter near the town of Golcuk in western Turkey.6 In Istanbul the general intensity was VI, with a limited
region of intensity VII just to the west.7
After a detailed assessment of the distribution of reported earthquake damage, historical earthquakes that affected the Marmara
region between 1500 and the present were associated with different
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segments of the Main Marmara Fault.8 Assuming lognormal probability density functions with a typical coefficient variation of 0.5, the
conditional probability for the individual rupture of segments located
to the immediate south of Istanbul can be determined to be about 42%
in the next fifty years. This exceptionally high probability favorably
compares with that reported in Parsons and colleagues using stresstransfer techniques.9
B. Scenario Earthquake
The geological and seismological information predicts the appropriate
earthquake scenario, which is usually given broad terms involving rupture length, location, and magnitude. For “worst case” scenarios, the
maximum event size is adopted. The Scenario Earthquake is defined as
the largest earthquake expected in a reasonable period of time (generally 500 years). For intrinsically probabilistic applications, the selection
of a Scenario Earthquake is based on the disaggregation of the hazard
to show which events contribute most to the loss. For Istanbul, almost
all these procedures converge to a large earthquake associated with
the Main Marmara Fault. On the basis of high conditional probabilities associated with certain segments, an Mw=7.5 magnitude strike-slip
earthquake associated with the rupturing of four segments in the Marmara Sea is selected as the “Credible Worst Case” Scenario Earthquake
(Figure 1). The source parameters of the Scenario Earthquake similar to
the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake.
C. Geotechnical Conditions
For the description of the geotechnical conditions in Istanbul, in addition to detailed surface geology data, we evaluated approximately 300
borehole investigations, 50 PS velocity logging, and 40 array microtremor studies. For determining the soil classes, we adopted the
NEHRP (1997) soil classification. This classification has international
acceptance in the earthquake engineering profession and facilitates the
differentiation of ground motion with respect to different site classes.10
For proper assessment of the seismic risk in urban centers, the potential of the earthquake-induced ground failure hazard—such as liquefaction, landslides, and surface fault rupture—needs to be determined.
Ground failure potential is defined as the probability of occurrence,
given the susceptibility of the ground and the opportunity exhibited by
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Figure 1. Location of the IRREW system in Marmara region and scenario
earthquake-based hazard in Istanbul.
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the severity of the ground motion. Techniques to evaluate the liquefaction potential are well established and generally involve the preparation of two types of maps, one showing the liquefaction susceptibility
and the other expressing the opportunity for critical levels of shaking.
The susceptibility map of liquefaction for Istanbul and vicinity based
on the Youd and Perkins (1978) methodology is provided in Erdik and
colleagues.11
D. Ground Motion Modeling
Deterministic seismic hazard is computed to understand the spatial
distribution of the earthquake ground motion that would result from
a given (Scenario) earthquake. The assessment methodology involves
the determination of the Scenario Earthquake, identification of proper
attenuation relationships, and appropriate site-response quantification. For this study, the deterministic hazard will be evaluated using
median (50-percentile) intensity-based and spectral acceleration-based
attenuation relationships.
Regional-specific intensity attenuation relationships developed on
the basis of Anatolian earthquakes12 were considered for the quantification of seismic hazard on the basis of MSK intensities. In hazard
assessments based on empirical intensity attenuations, the modification of the ground motion has been traditionally expressed in terms of
intensity changes empirically correlated with the ground conditions.
Considering that this intensity attenuation has been assessed for average soil conditions in the region, the intensity map is modified to reflect
the influence of geological conditions using modification rules similar
to Evernden and Thomson.13 The local geology-specific increments
vary between –0.4 (Cavusbasi Formation) and 1.1 (Bakirkoy, Gungoren, Cukurcesme and Kusdili Alluvium). Site-dependent intensities
for the Scenario Earthquake are presented in Figure 1. Using the damage definitions of the 1998 European Macroseismic Scale (EMS-1998),
a general understanding of damage from exposure to these intensity
levels can be gained. For the vulnerability class where the general reinforced concrete multi-story building stock in Istanbul is located, EMS1998 provides the following damage definitions:
Intensity VII:
Intensity VIII:

A few buildings sustain moderate damage
Many buildings suffer moderate damage; a few substantial to heavy damage
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Many buildings suffer substantial to heavy damage; a
few very heavy damage
(Where “Few” describes less than 20% and “Many”
describes between 20% and 60%.)

E. Inventory of Elements at Risk
Buildings, population, lifeline systems, and socioeconomic activities
constitute the “elements at risk” in urban areas. Buildings and lifeline systems are generally termed built environment. Building inventory data is compiled from the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
and State Statistical Institute, complemented by Turk Telekom analog
maps, imagery from helicopter flights, and aerial and satellite imagery.
Classification of buildings in Istanbul is essential to ensure a uniform
interpretation of data and results. The building inventory uses the
three basic categories of Structural Systems, Number of Stories, and
Year of Construction. Each category is further subdivided into groups
to yield 24 different building classes. The Istanbul metropolitan area
was divided into grids as 0.005°×0.005° (approximately 400m × 600m)
cells for the aggregation of hazard and physical inventory data. The
day- and night-time populations of 28 districts were determined, and
then assigned to the geo-cells in order to calculate the human losses
due to a major earthquake. The population and building data for Istanbul were obtained from the State Statistics Institute. For the determination of day population, the Istanbul Transportation Master Plan,
prepared by the Municipality of Istanbul Metropolitan in 1997, is being
utilized.
F. Earthquake Vulnerabilities
There are two main approaches for generating vulnerability relationships. The first approach is based on damage data obtained from field
observations after an earthquake or from experiments. The second
approach is based on numerical analysis of the structure, either through
detailed time-history analysis or through simplified methods. The first
approach used in developing vulnerability estimates is called the Experience Data approach. It is based on the fact that certain classes of constructed facilities tend to share common characteristics and experience
similar types of damage in earthquakes. They play an indispensable
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role in the fragility curve development study, because only they can be
used to calibrate the vulnerability relationships developed analytically.
Loss estimates using this approach are more valid when evaluating the
risk of large portfolios of facilities than for individual facilities.
The EMS-1998, an updated version of the MSK-81 scale (MSK-1981),
differentiates the structural vulnerabilities into six classes (A to F).
Reinforced concrete buildings with low levels of earthquake-resistant
design are assigned an average vulnerability class of C. Due to deficiencies in design, concrete quality, and construction practices, the bulk
of the reinforced concrete building stock in Istanbul is in this vulnerability class. EMS-1998 provides the following definitions of intensity,
where “Few” describes less than 20% and “Many” describes between
20% and 60%.
Intensity VI:
Intensity VII:
Intensity VIII:
Intensity IX:
Intensity X:

A few buildings of vulnerability class C sustain D1
damage
A few buildings of vulnerability class C sustain D2
damage
Many buildings of vulnerability class C suffer D2 damage, a few D3
Many buildings of vulnerability class C suffer D3 damage, a few D4
Many buildings of vulnerability class C suffer D4 damage, a few D5.

The damage to reinforced concrete buildings are classified as:
D1:
D2:
D3:
D4:
D5:

Negligible to Slight Structural Damage (SD), Slight Non-Structural Damage (N-SD)
Moderate damage (Slight SD, Moderate N-SD)
Substantial to heavy damage (Moderate SD, Heavy N-SD)
Very heavy damage (Heavy SD, very heavy N-SD)
Destruction

Based on available empirical data as well as compilations from referenced works and engineering interpretations, the vulnerability curves
for the general mid-rise (4–8 story) R/C frame buildings in Turkey are
provided in Figure 2. The horizontal axis indicates the range (uncertainty) of MSK intensities and the vertical scale indicates the percentage loss for the five different damage grades, D1 through D5. This
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Figure 2. Intensity based earthquake vulnerability relationships for
mid-rise reinforced concrete buildings in Turkey.

vulnerability relationship compares favorably with those presented in
Coburn and Spence.14 Considering the damage level relations between
low, medium, and high-rise R/C frame structures, the vulnerability
curves for low-rise (1–4 stories) and high-rise (≥ stories) R/C frame
buildings are obtained by half a unit left shifting of the intensity scale
in the horizontal axis of the vulnerability curves of the medium-rise
R/C frame buildings.
The earthquake loss scenario developed for Istanbul has used building vulnerability relationships that express the percentage damage for
each typified building group and in certain damage classes against
the EMS-1998 intensity ranges and spectral displacements. The spectral displacement-based building vulnerabilities (also called “fragility
curves”) relate the probability of being in, or exceeding, a building
damage state to a given spectral displacement demand parameter
using the methodology developed in HAZUS (http://www.fema.gov/
hazus/). The most vulnerable building group is found to be mediumrise (4–7 story) reinforced concrete frame buildings built prior to 1975.
These are cast-in-situ reinforced concrete frame buildings with unreinforced masonry infill walls designed on the basis of outdated codes
and generally suffering from reinforcement corrosion problems. In the
majority, the ground floors are left open for shops, and irregular plan
shapes are common due to irregular land lots and urban congestion.
Death tolls in earthquakes arise mostly from structural collapses
and, to a lesser degree, collateral hazards. The number and severity
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Table 2. Casualty Rates for Reinforced Concrete Structures for Istanbul

Injury Severity
Severity 1
Severity 2
Severity 3
Severity 4

Low
Damage
0.050
0.005
0
0

Casualty Rates for R/C structures (%)
Medium
Heavy
Very Heavy
Damage
Damage
Damage
0.20
1
10–50
0.02
0.50
08–15
0
0.01
04–10
04–10
0
0.01

of casualties are strongly related to the extent of both structural and
non-structural building damage. In smaller earthquakes, non-structural damages govern the number and type of casualties, whereas in
stronger shakings, casualties are highly affected by structural damages, especially by the number of partially or totally collapsed structures. One of the major inputs necessary for earthquake casualty
estimation is a correlation between the number and severity of injuries
and the damage level of the structures. This, however, is not easily
attainable due to the poor quality or lack of information in earthquake
casualty data. Casualty for any given structure type, building damage
level, and injury severity level can be calculated by the multiplication
of Population per Building, Number of Damaged Buildings, and the
Casualty Rate. Casualty rates for different building types are established in HAZUS99 for urban settings in the United States. For other
urban settings, appropriate casualty rates need to be developed using
empirical earthquake damage and casualty data. The casualty rates for
reinforced concrete structures in Turkey are given in Table 2.
The percentages given in the table above are to be multiplied by the
number of people in the building at the time of the earthquake. Two
different values are given in the column “Very Heavy Damage.” The
smaller values are associated with the partial collapse of the building,
whereas the larger values are given for total collapse (of the “pancake”
type).
G. Physical and Human Losses Due to Earthquake
In order to perform building damage and loss analysis, the building
inventory stock database should be provided for each geo-cell. The
seismic hazard information in terms of intensities for Intensity-based
analysis and spectral accelerations for Spectral Displacement-based
analysis should also be aggregated at the center of the geo-cells (400 m
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Figure 3. Intensity based distribution of all buildings damaged
beyond repair (complete damage).

by 600 m). To compute the damage probability ratios intensity-based
vulnerabilities and/or spectral displacement-based fragility curves
for vulnerabilities associated with each building, class type should be
specified. Economic losses associated with the general building stock
are estimated using the building damage losses and costs for different
structural damages of each building group. In order to estimate the
number and severity of the casualties, the day and night-time population for each building type in geo-cells should be provided, together
with the casualty rates for each building class and damage grade.
On the basis of the two independent approaches (intensity-based
and spectral displacement-based), a total of 35,000 to 40,000 buildings (about 5% of the total building stock) were estimated damaged
beyond repair. Most of the casualties are expected in this damage
group, especially in a subset of this group where the collapse will be
of the worst pancake form. In pancaked buildings the floors pile up
on top of each other, rendering very difficult conditions for search
and rescue. Our estimate for pancaked buildings will be in the vicinity of 5,000 to 6,000. The expected building damages, calculated by
the intensity-based deterministic approach, is provided in Figure 3.
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Figure 4. Distribution of direct financial losses due to building damage.

Furthermore, about 70,000 buildings will receive extensive damage
and 200,000 buildings will be moderately damaged. Both of these damage groups are repairable. The total monetary losses due to building
damages caused by the Scenario Earthquake are estimated to be in the
range of $11 billion (Figure 4). Building damages are mostly concentrated in the densely populated districts located in the southwestern
part of the city, such as Eminönü, Fatih, Zeytinburnu, Bakirköy, Bahçelievler, the southern part of Küçükçekmece and Avcilar, and to a lesser
degree, in districts such as Kadiköy, Maltepe, and Kartal, located in the
southeastern part of Istanbul. Although situated in relatively farther
locations from the causative fault, due to the building density and vulnerability conditions, the districts of Beyoglu, Eyüp and Bayrampasa
are also expected to undergo high levels of damage. As the result of the
analysis conducted for various structure types, the mid-rise reinforced
concrete structures constructed before 1980 are found to constitute
the most vulnerable building class. The expected casualties are calculated using both the intensity-based and the spectral displacementbased approaches. The results for both the night-time and daytime
population are obtained for the four levels of casualty severities from
the spectral displacement-based approach. Thus, on the basis of these
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Figure 5. Distribution of deaths for a night-time scenario earthquake.

two approaches, it is estimated that the death totals would vary from
30,000 to 40,000. How many of the casualties in the serious injury
class would be lost is difficult to estimate since it would depend on
the post-earthquake emergency services. If we assumed that about
one-third would be lost, that would bring the total estimate of deaths
to the 40,000–50,000 level. Death distribution based on the intensity
approach is presented in Figure 5. As the result of the intensity-based
analysis, a total of about 600,000 households, and from the spectralbased analysis, a total of about 430,000 households were assessed to
be in need of shelter following the Scenario Earthquake. This amount
constitutes an upper limit for expected shelter needs, since the conversion of this number to total number of households is subject to some
discussion, and the vacancy of some dwelling units should also be considered. These values are the best estimates for a Mw=7.5 earthquake
at the closest position to Istanbul that can be provided in the absence of
detailed building inventory and geotechnical data. The death figures,
especially, entail large uncertainties arising from the time and date of
the earthquake.
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Figure 6. Rapid response stations.

H. Istanbul Earthquake Rapid Response and Early Warning System
To reduce losses in a disastrous earthquake in Istanbul, a dense strongmotion network has been established. The Istanbul Earthquake Rapid
Response and Early Warning System (IERREWS) is composed of two
independent systems designed to provide pre-earthquake early warning and post-earthquake rapid response services. One hundred of the
strong-motion recorders are stationed in dense settlements in the metropolitan area of Istanbul in dial-up mode for Rapid Response information generation (Figure 6). An additional ten strong-motion stations
are sited at locations as close as possible to the Great Marmara Fault in
on-line data transmission mode to enable earthquake Early Warning
(Figure 7). IERREWS is designed and operated by Bogazici University
with the logistical support of the Governorate of Istanbul, First Army
Headquarters, and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. The construction of the system is realized by the GeoSig Inc. (http://www.geosig.
com) and Electrowatt-Ekono (www.ewe.ch) consortium. Communications are provided by ARIA GSM (http://www.aria.com.tr) service
provider.
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Figure 7. Early warning stations.

IERREWS consists of the following components:
• Monitoring system composed of various sensors
• Communication link (off-line for the Rapid Response and on-line
for the Early Warning) that transmits data from the sensors to computers
• Data processing facilities that converts data to information
• System that issues and communicates the Rapid Response information and Early Warning
Earthquake Early Warning in urban and industrial areas allows for
clean emergency shutdown of systems susceptible to damage, such
as power stations, transportation, computer centers, and telephone
systems. Currently such systems are either implemented or in the construction or planning stage in Mexico, Romania, California, Japan, Taiwan, Turkey, and Greece. Systems currently in operation in Bucharest
(http://www.infp.ro/publications/ews.htm) and Mexico (http://www.
gfz-potsdam.de/ewc98/abstract/espinosa.html) have the capability of
issuing an earthquake Early Warning in advance by relying on significant distances between the source and the populated urban regions.
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I. Rapid Response System
The Rapid Response component of IERREWS has the objective of providing:
• Reliable information for accurate, effective characterization of the
shaking and damage by other rapid post-earthquake maps (Shake,
Damage, and Casualty maps) for rapid response
• Recorded motion for post-earthquake performance analysis of structures
• Empirical basis for long-term improvements in seismic microzonation, seismic provisions of building codes and construction guidelines
• Seismological data to improve the understanding of earthquake
generation at the source and seismic wave propagation
Current examples internationally are the Rapid Response systems implemented in California (USGS, Caltech, and CDMG TriNet
ShakeMaps—http://www.trinet.org/shake/, Caltech-USGS Broadcast
of Earthquakes (CUBE) System http://www.gps.caltech.edu/~bryant/
cube.html, UC Berkeley Seismological Laboratory and USGS Menlo
Park (REDI) www.seismo.berkeley.edu/seismo/redi), Taiwan (Earthquake Rapid Reporting System of CWB http://www.earth.sinica.edu.
tw/cdr/IASPEI/data/cwb/rapid.html) and Japan (Real-time Earthquake
Assessment Disaster System in Yokohama—READY—http://www.city.
yokohama.jp/me/bousai/dppc/handout-e.html).
The Istanbul Earthquake Rapid Response system satisfies the COSMOS (Consortium of Organizations for Strong-Motion Observation
Systems) Urban Strong-Motion Reference Station Guidelines (www.
cosmos-eq.org) for the location of instruments, instrument specifications, and housing specifications. The relative instrument spacing
is about 2–3 km, which corresponds to about 3 wavelengths in firm
ground conditions and more than 10 wavelengths for soft soils for horizontally propagating 1 s shear waves. Strong-motion instruments are
generally located at grade level in small- and medium-sized buildings,
such that the motion recorded corresponds to that on the ground in the
surrounding area. Site geology at stations has been characterized in
general terms. Certain stations have borehole data. New borehole surveys for other stations are being planned. For communication of data
from the rapid response stations to the data processing center, and
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for instrument monitoring, a reliable and redundant GSM communication system (backed up by dedicated landlines and a microwave
system) is used, on the basis of a protocol agreement with the ARIA
GSM Service provider. In normal times, the Rapid Response stations
are being interrogated (for health and instrument monitoring) on a
regular basis. Triggered by an earthquake, each station will process the
streaming three-channel strong-motion data to yield the spectral accelerations at specific periods, 12 Hz filtered peak ground acceleration
and peak ground velocity, and will send these parameters in the form
of SMS messages at every 20 s directly to the main data center through
the GSM communication system. The main data processing center is
located in the Department of Earthquake Engineering, Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute, Bogazici University (KOERIBU). A secondary center, located in the Seismological Laboratory of the
same Institute, serves as a redundant center that can function in case
of failure in the main one. Shake, damage, and casualty distribution
maps will be automatically generated at the data centers after an earthquake and communicated to the end users within three minutes. Fullrecorded waveforms at each station can be retrieved using GSM and
GPRS modems subsequent to an earthquake.
For the generation of Rapid Response information, two methodologies based on spectral displacements and instrumental intensities
are coded into specific computer programs similar to HAZUS (http://
www.fema.gov/hazus/). Both of the methodologies essentially rely on
the building inventory database, fragility curves, and the methodology developments in the Istanbul Earthquake Risk Assessment Study
conducted by the Department of Earthquake Engineering of Bogazici
University.
For the computation of input ground motion parameters, spectral
displacements obtained from the SMS messages sent from stations
are interpolated to determine the spectral displacement values at the
center of each geo-cell, using two-dimensional splines. The earthquake
demand at the center of each geo-cell is computed using these spectral
displacements. The instrumental intensity at each center of these geocells is computed as a function of short-period spectral acceleration.
Using the response spectra and the instrumental intensities, building
damage and casualties are computed separately by using the spectral
displacement-based and intensity-based fragility curves. The computations are conducted at the centers of a 0.01°×0.01° grid system comprised of geo-cells (1120 m×830 m) size. The building inventories (in 24
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Figure 8. Examples of building damage map that results from a
randomly simulated strong motion data.

groups) for each geo-cell, together with their spectral displacement and
intensity-based fragility curves, are incorporated into the software.
The casualties are estimated on the basis of the number of collapsed
buildings and degree of damage. An example of a building damage
map that results from randomly simulated strong-motion data is provided in Figure 8. For transmission of the Rapid Response information
to the concerned agencies (Istanbul Governorate, Istanbul Municipality, and First Army Headquarters) digital radio modem and GPRS
communication systems are used (Figure 9). The Rapid Response system was successfully tested by the 06.05.2004 (Md=4.5) earthquake
in the Marmara Sea. The distribution of Peak Ground Acceleration
(PGA) in Istanbul caused by this earthquake is provided in Figure 10.
Although this earthquake is recorded by 80% of the stations, needless
to say it is not large enough to cause any damage.
J. Early Warning System
Key to earthquake early warning is a continuous communication link
between seismic sensors (ideally deployed close to the seismic source)
and a central processing facility. If the incoming ground motion data at
the processing unit is classified as critical, the system issues a warning
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Figure 9. Post-earthquake damage maps are sent to SAR Headquarters
of the Governorate, Metropolitan Municipality and First Army.

to endangered people or facilities. This thereby takes advantage of the
fact that seismic waves propagate slower (3–6 km/s) than the electromagnetic waves used for transmission of the warning. Generally, the
warning time is in the range of only a few up to 70 seconds, which
depends on the distances between the seismic source, the recording
instruments, and the endangered area or facility.
Configurations in which seismic sensors (accelerometers) are
installed between a known source area and the user are called frontdetection systems. However, if the location of the seismic source is
unknown in advance, the realization of the Early Warning system
requires an expanded network of seismic instruments. In addition to
Istanbul, the typical examples for front-detection systems are installed
in Mexico15 and Romania,16 while large and complex fault systems like
the San Andreas Fault zone in California demand complex-detection
systems.
The response to an alert given by the earthquake Early Warning system generally proceeds fully automatically:
• High-speed trains and metros are slowed down or stopped to avoid
derailment
• Pipelines and gas lines are shut down to minimize fire hazards
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Figure 10. Distribution of peak ground acceleration (PGA) in Istanbul
caused by the 06.05.2004 (Md=4.5) earthquake in the Marmara Sea.

• Manufacturing operations are shut down to inhibit likely damage to
the equipment
• Vital computer information is saved and disk heads are retracted
away from the disk surface
The benefit of audio and visual alarms is subject to controversy,
since they require proper training of people and reasonably long warning times. The Mexican Seismic Alert System (SAS) is the only public
alarm system in the world. The warning time of 60–70 seconds, before
the high amplitude shear and surface waves arrive at the capital Mexico City (a distance of about 320 km from the Guerrero subduction
zone), provides an almost perfect background for earthquake early
warning.
Important progress in data transfers and real-time data processing
in recent years alleviates previous restrictions on the realization of
Early Warning systems. However, there are still unsolved problems; for
example, the reliability of alerts and the question of liabilities incurred
by the institution that issues the warning. In the mid-1950s, Japanese
National Railways started the installation of simple alarm seismometers—strictly speaking, this was no EWS—along their railway lines.
Later, with the operation of the “bullet” trains Tokaido Shinkansen and
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Tohoku Shinkansen, this front alarm system was improved and alarm
seismometers were installed every 20 km along the lines. The stations
issue a warning whenever a preset level of horizontal ground acceleration (40 gal) is exceeded. Trains in the vicinity of the respective alarm
stations are automatically slowed down or stopped in order to avoid
derailments. The contemporary Japanese Urgent Earthquake Detection
and Alarm System (UrEDAS) consists of 30 strong-motion instruments
capable of determining the area of sustained damage, using information about magnitude and hypocenter obtained from P-wave observations (“P-wave alarm”). Ordinary alarm seismometers and UrEDAS
are combined into the Japanese “Compact UrEDAS.”
In the Early Warning part of the IERREWS, ten strong-motion stations are located as close as possible to the Great Marmara Fault in
“on-line” mode. Continuous telemetry of data between these stations
and the main data center is realized with a digital spread spectrum
radio modem system involving repeater stations selected in the region
(Figure 7). Considering the complexity of fault rupture and the short
fault distances involved, a simple and robust Early Warning algorithm,
based on the exceeding of specified threshold time domain amplitude
levels, is implemented. The band-pass filtered accelerations and the
cumulative absolute velocity (CAV-time integral of the absolute acceleration) are compared with specified threshold levels. When any acceleration or CAV (on any channel) in a given station exceeds specific
selectable threshold values it is considered a vote. Whenever we have
two or three (selectable) station votes within a selectable time interval, after the first vote, the first alarm is declared. The early warning
information (consisting of three alarm levels) will be communicated
to the appropriate servo shutdown systems of the recipient facilities,
which will automatically decide proper action based on the alarm
level. Depending on the location of the earthquake (initiation of fault
rupture) and the recipient facility, the alarm time can be as high as
about 8 s.
IV. Structural Health Monitoring
Instrumentation of the critical structures with earthquake strongground-motion recorders monitor the vibrations (i.e., the structural
response) during an earthquake. Comparison of these recordings with
those taken before the earthquake can yield variations in structural
response, with implications for structural damage and reduction of
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Figure 11. Structures in Istanbul instrumented with earthquake
strong motion recorders.

earthquake worthiness. The currently monitored structures and facilities in Istanbul (Figure 11) include the following.

Fatih Sultan Mehmet Suspension Bridge
The monitoring system, encompassing twelve tri-axial accelerometers,
was installed in November 2001. The data, digitized at the source, is
monitored by two parallel PC units. The acceleration data is transmitted on-line to the analysis center at the Department of Earthquake
Engineering, Bogazici University. The modal vibration parameters are
monitored using the measured response.

Bogazici Suspension Bridge
In 1983 a structural health monitoring system was installed by the General Directorate of State Highways. This system is currently non-functional. Ten temporary strong-motion recorders, installed in the deck
temporarily by the Department of Earthquake Engineering, Bogazici
University, will be operated pending the overhaul (or replacement) of
the existing monitoring system.

Hagia Sophia
A network of strong-motion accelerometers, consisting of nine interconnected Kinemetrics SSA-2 units, has been operational in the struc121
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ture since August 1991 as part of the effort to determine its earthquake
worthiness. The instruments cover three levels. One instrument is at
the ground level; four are located at the cornice level next to the springing points of the four main arches; and four are at the dome base level
on the crowns of the main arches.

Suleymaniye
An accelerometer system consisting of eight individual Kinemetrics
SSA-2 units operated in the Süleymaniye mosque between 1994 and
1999. The system was replaced by an interconnected array of eight
GeoSig recorders in 1999. The positioning of the instruments is similar to the Hagia Sophia array except that there is no instrument at the
ground level.

Enron Power Plant
The earthquake monitoring network system for Enron-Trakya Elektrik Power Plant facilities includes eight on-line strong-ground-motion
recorders distributed at critical locations within the industrial facility.
The recorders are connected on-line to the main processing center to
send nearly real-time data packets.

Is Bank Tower
Earthquake monitoring and alert systems were designed and installed
to monitor the structural response and to generate earthquake alarm
signals for the building facilities and emergency system. For this purpose, four GSR-18 strong-ground-motion stations are utilized. The
operational system is similar to that employed for the Enron Power
Plant.
V. Conclusions
The effectiveness of using or disregarding earthquake risk mitigation
techniques—building rehabilitation, adoption and enforcement of seismic provisions in building codes, prudent community growth, and
improved disaster response capabilities—are well known and have
been demonstrated in Turkish cities and also throughout the world.
The focal element of these mitigation activities is a technically sound
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state-of-the-art assessment of the various levels of losses. Only by
comprehending the consequences of earthquake losses in Istanbul can
decisions be made at the governmental level about mitigation priorities and optimal approaches.
In order to create an earthquake resilient city and society, earthquake hazard mitigation strategies, such as rehabilitation of existing
vulnerable buildings, development of appropriate zoning ordinances,
and enforcement of earthquake building codes, should be enforced.
They would serve as a countermeasure against earthquake losses indicated in the loss estimation study. In addition, the planning for contingency measures—such as identification of alternate transportation
routes, emergency response and recovery, identification of emergency
shelter locations, availability of medical services, food, water and other
essential utilities, and Rapid Response-Early Warning systems—needs
to be maximized. 
•
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